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Private Enforcement of Company Law
and Securities Regulation in Korea
hwa-jin kim
1 Introduction
This chapter offers a brief overview of the private enforcement of corpo-
rate law and securities regulation in Korea, with particular reference to
the current legislative efforts in the KoreanNational Assembly and recent
court cases. This chapter also talks about Korea’s ill-fated and misguided
adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory in securities fraud litigation.
2 Private Enforcement of Corporate Law
2.1 Shareholder Derivative Suit
The Korean Commercial Code (KCC) provides that where a director
(1) has acted in violation of any laws and regulations or in violation of the
company’s articles of incorporation or (2) has neglected to perform his or
her duties, such director shall be jointly and severally liable for damages
to the company resulting from such acts or omissions.1 This rule is
privately enforced through the shareholders derivative litigation under
Articles 403, 404, 405 and 406 of the KCC.
The shareholders derivative suit mechanism has been in place since the
enactment of the KCC in 1960. However, up until 1997, for the thirty-five
years since the enactment, not a single lawsuit was filed. After the Asian
1 Art. 399 Para. 1 KCC. The director’s basic duty of care is provided in Art. 382 Para. 2 KCC
that refers to Art. 681 (fiduciary duty in the agency relationship) Korean Civil Code.
In practice, the duty of care shall require the directors of the following actions: duty of
attention on the activities of the company; duty to attend meetings; duty to review
corporate information and documents; duty to thoroughly discuss major policies and
business issues; and duty to review all major filings with the regulatory agencies. See
generally Hwa-Jin Kim and Sung-Joon Park, ‘Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in Korean
Companies’, in Korean Business Law, Hwa-Jin Kim ed., (Edward Elgar, 2012), 1.
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economic crisis in 1997, some shareholder activist groups started to use
the derivative litigation to improve corporate governance of large Korean
companies.2 Still, the genuine derivative suits are rare. Ordinary share-
holders hardly have incentives to file the suit. Private enforcement of
corporate law in Korea is more to improve corporate governance of
Korean firms than for legal remedy. For that reason, current policy
discussion focuses rather on the introduction of double derivative lawsuit.
2.2 Double Derivative Suit
The discrepancy between cash-flow right and control right in big Korean
conglomerates (Chaebols) is quite substantial. For instance, the average
ownership of the controlling shareholders of non-public member firms
of Samsung Group was 78.43 per cent, whereas their cash-flow rights
were as low as 19.43 per cent.3 For public member firms the number was
13.52 per cent and 1.14 per cent, respectively.4 Since Korea does not allow
dual-class commons, the discrepancy comes from control over affiliated
firms, including financial firms, and circular shareholdings. Those
affiliated firms are quite often non-listed private firms that are not subject
to the disclosure obligations of the Korean Capital Markets Act (KCMA).
In such a complicated ownership structure with a lack of transparency,
there is a risk that non-listed subsidiaries may be used for tunneling and
other questionable rent-seeking acts. Even if something were to happen
at the subsidiary level, the only shareholder is the parent controlled by the
controlling minority shareholder. He or she won’t cause the firm to sue
managers of subsidiaries. Reformist groups are trying to rectify the
situation through introducing the double derivative lawsuit into
the KCC.
Surprisingly, in 2003, the Seoul High Court ruled that shareholders of
a listed company can sue the directors of non-listed subsidiaries.5 The
case involved a manager of an 80 per cent subsidiary who committed
embezzlement. The court pointed out the possibility and risk of
2 See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner, ‘Shareholder Suits Against
Korean Directors’, in Korean Business Law, Hwa-Jin Kim ed. (Edward Elgar, 2012), 27,
35–40.
3 For the corporate governance issues of Samsung Group, see Hwa-Jin Kim, ‘Concentrated
Ownership and Corporate Control:Wallenberg Sphere and Samsung Group’, 14 Journal of
Korean Law 39 (2014).
4 See James Jinho Chang and Hyun-Han Shin, ‘Family Ownership and Performance in
Korean Conglomerates’, 15 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 329 (2007).
5 Judgment of 22 August 2003, 2002-Na-13746.
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wrongdoings through subsidiaries under common control of the man-
agers of the listed parent. The court also opined that the definition of the
shareholder under Article 403 of the KCC shall include the shareholder
of the parent company.6 However, the Korean Supreme Court quickly
reversed the decision of the Seoul High Court in 2004 by ruling that the
shareholder of the listed parent company does not qualify as the share-
holder of its subsidiaries.7
The case reignited the policy discussion, and a revision of the KCC has
been the subject of a lively debate since then. Finally in 2013, the Korean
Ministry of Justice submitted a bill to the Korean National Assembly
which included, among others, the double derivative lawsuit. However,
the controversial bill did not go through the final stage of the legislative
procedure and is still pending. The Korean National Assembly is cur-
rently discussing ways to reform the corporate governance of large
conglomerates. The double derivative lawsuit is very much on the agenda
of the relevant committees of the legislative body.
The concern is that private companies maymore or less become public
companies through strike lawsuits, thus losing the privilege and benefit of
being private.8 When introduced, if at all, the court shall take
a conservative approach to the double derivative suit. The judgment of
the Seoul High Court was based on the compensation and deterrence
theory.9 In this particular case, veil piercing was not available because
there existed no 100 per cent relationship between the parent and the
subsidiary. It should be noted, however, that in the United States most
court cases adopt the veil piercing theory in allowing a double derivative
suit.10 As Korean case law is already familiar with veil piercing,11 the
double derivative suit may not be that necessary after all.
6 See Ok-Rial Song, ‘The Double Derivative Suits under the Commercial Code’, 28 Korean
Civil Law Case Studies 528 (2006) (Kor.) (supporting the judgment).
7 Judgment of 23 September 2004, 2003-Da-49221.
8 There is a report that from 2000 to 2004, 81 per cent of the lawsuits filed against business
corporations were dismissed or withdrawn. See Hwa-Jin Kim, Corporate Finance and
Governance, 2nd ed., (Pakyoungsa, 2012) (Kor.), 304.
9 There are scholarly opinions that the shareholder derivative lawsuit does not deter
wrongdoings of corporate managers, see, e.g. Roberta Romano, ‘The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation without Foundation?’, 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 55
(1991).
10 See David W. Locascio, ‘The Dilemma of Double Derivative Suits’, 83 Northwestern
University Law Review 729 (1989), 743–746.
11 See, e.g. the Korean Supreme Court Judgment of 19 January 2001, 97-Da-21604. See
generally Joseph Cho and Eun Young Shin, ‘Piercing of the Corporate Veil in Korea: Case
Commentary’, Korean Business Law, Hwa-Jin Kim ed. (Edward Elgar, 2012), 101.
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3 Private Enforcement of Securities Regulation
3.1 Securities Fraud Litigation
With respect to public companies in Korea, any director who provides
false or misleading statements or fails to indicate material concerns shall
be liable to the party for any damages incurred as a result of such false
statements or material omissions. They have a due diligence defence.12
This rule applies to frauds in the primary as well as secondary markets,
and has been well enforced privately, creating sizable case law and
professional literature.13 Therefore, in terms of the private enforcement
of securities regulation in Korea, the ‘new’ securities class action has
received more attention.
3.2 Securities Class Action
The controversial Securities Class Action Act (SCAA) was passed by the
Korean National Assembly in December of 2003 with the aim of provid-
ing a more effective means of relief for small investors in the capital
markets while at the same time enhancing the transparency of corporate
governance. The SCAA came into full effect on 1 January 2007. The cause
of action is narrower than which is available in the United States. Claims
for damages under the SCAA are limited to the recovery of loss arising
from false statements in the registration statements, business prospec-
tuses, annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports, insider trading, stock
price manipulation, and faulty auditing.
The first class action lawsuit was filed in April of 2009. The second and
third lawsuits were filed in December of 2011 and in June of 2014,
respectively. Only nine lawsuits have been filed in the past ten years.
In other words, it looks like the law has become almost ineffectual.
It should be noted though that the law went into effect in 2007, i.e.
after a three-year waiting period. When the law was enacted, Korean
firms were understandably horrified and substantially improved
accounting practices during those three years. The law stipulated that if
firms confess past sins, it won’t be applied retroactively.14 In that sense,
the law contributed to the improvement of corporate governance of large
Korean firms.
12 Art. 125 and Art. 162 of the KCMA. These provisions will be discussed below.
13 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Theoretical Foundations of Securities Regulation, (Pakyoungsa, 2004),
Ch. 3.(Kor.).
14 See Kim, Corporate Finance and Governance, 349.
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Unfortunately, the future of the SCAA does not look bright. There is
no Milberg (Weiss) in Korea. Furthermore, no contingency fee arrange-
ment is allowed.15 Since no discovery is available in civil procedure,
plaintiffs regularly have a hard time proving the claim despite the fact
that Korean law is quite accommodating, as discussed below. In addition,
no institutional investor may want to play the lead plaintiff due to their
relationships with potential fee-paying corporate clients.16 Perhaps the
introduction of the securities class action in Korea will remain and be
recorded as too hasty and ambitious a reform effort.
4 Halliburton in Korea?
4.1 Importing the Fraud-on-the-Market
As far as the securities fraud action is concerned, Korea imported all the
elements of the cause of action from the United States except scienter:
Materiality, misrepresentation or omission, reliance, causation and
damages.17 Korean law does not know the concept of scienter. The focus
here is on reliance, which is the single most controversial requirement in
securities fraud litigation in Korea, and any jurisdiction for that matter.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson18 introduced the rebuttable presumption of
reliance in securities fraud litigation (transaction causation requirement)
based on the fraud-on-the-market theory.19 However, the US Federal
15 See Black, Cheffins and Klausner, ‘Shareholder Suits Against Korean Directors’, at 42.
The SCAA provides for attorney’s fees to be paid out of the recovery to the plaintiff class.
Art. 44 of the SCAA.
16 Cf. Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights’, 113 Columbia Law Review
863 (2013).
17 For cause of action, see generally James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman and Donald
C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials, 7th ed., (Wolters Kluwer,
2013) Chs.9 and 13.
18 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See Donald Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the
Market’, Wisconsin Law Review 157 (2009); Jonathan R. Macey et al., ‘Lessons from
Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v.
Levinson’, 77 Virginia Law Review 1017 (1991).
19 Cf. Note, ‘The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory’, 95 Harvard Law Review 1143 (1982);
Brad M. Barber et al., ‘The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of
Common Stocks’ Efficiency’, 19 Journal of Corporation Law 285 (1994); Daniel
R. Fischel, ‘Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities’, 38 Business Lawyer 1 (1982); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey
P. Miller, ‘Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory’, 42 Stanford Law Review 1059 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, ‘The Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues’, 74 Cornell Law Review 923 (1989). For the
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Supreme Court decision has been very controversial. For example, some
voices were raised to reconsider the case in Amgen Inc. et al.
v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds.20 And, in 2014, it
once again became the hot issue in Halliburton Co. et al. v. Erica
P. John Fund, Inc. (23 June 2014).21 AlthoughHalliburton did not change
precedent, it seemed evident that the fraud-on-the-market theory was
still facing tough challenges from new perspectives in contemporary
economics.22
Halliburton was a wake-up call whereas Basic was an inspiration for
the Korean legislature and judiciary. The Korean Supreme Court adopted
the fraud-on-the-market theory not only in the securities fraud litigation,
but also in litigations in tort law claims. It is interesting to note that under
the KCMA there is no transaction causation requirement at all.
Article 125 (Liabilities for Damages Caused by False Statements, etc.)
(1) The following persons shall be liable for damages inflicted upon any
person as a result of acquiring securities by including a false description or
representation of any material fact in a registration statement (including
a corrective registration statement and supplements thereto; hereafter the
same shall apply in this Article) and an investment prospectus (including
a preliminary investment prospectus and a short-form investment prospec-
tus; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article) or omitting a material fact
therefrom: Provided, that such person shall not be liable if he/she proves
that he/shewas unable to discover such inclusion or omission even if he/she
exercised reasonable care or that the person who acquired the securities
knew the fact at the time when he/she made an offer to acquire them: . . .
Article 162 (Liability for Damages Caused by False Description, etc.)
(1) The following persons shall be liable for damages sustained by a person
who acquired or disposed of securities (including securities depositary
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, see Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’, 70 Virginia Law Review 549 (1984); Donald
Langevoort, ‘Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited’, 140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 851 (1992); Reinier Kraakman,
‘Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of ‘Discounted’ Share Prices as an
Acquisition Motive’, 88 Columbia Law Review 891 (1988).
20 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). See Donald C. Langevoort, ‘Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-
Market?: Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton’, Georgetown
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13–058 (2013).
21 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, ‘Rethinking Basic’, 69 Business Lawyer 671
(2014); Merritt B. Fox, ‘Halliburton II: What It’s All About’, 1 Journal of Financial
Regulation 135 (2015).
22 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein et al., ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’, 50 Stanford
Law Review 1471 (1998); Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, ‘How Behavioral Economics
Trims Its Sails and Why’, 127 Harvard Law Review 1593 (2014).
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receipts related to such securities and other securities specified by
Presidential Decree; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article) issued
by a corporation obligated to submit a business report due to a false
description or representation of a material fact in such business report,
half-yearly report, quarterly report, or material fact report under Article
159 (1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘business report, etc.’) or a document
attached thereto (excluding audit reports prepared by an accounting
auditor), or due to an omission of a description or representation of
a material fact therein: Provided, That a person held liable for such
damages shall not be liable if he/she proves that he/she was unable to
know such fact although he/she exercised reasonable care, or that the
person who acquired or disposed of such securities knew the fact at the
time he/she acquired or disposed of the securities . . .
The Korean Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory in
a more plaintiffs-friendly way because of the statutes’ wording. Reliance is
not even presumed; it is given. As a result, it cannot be rebutted.23 The
provisions in the KCMA were not a drafting error of some sort. It was the
1997 financial crisis, which created a scenario last observed in the 1930s in
theUnited States. Plaintiffs had to be strongly protected at that time.As there
was no discovery available in Korea, this was how the country decided to
respond.TheKorean SupremeCourtwent one step further in that it adopted
the fraud-on-the-market theory even in tort law cases,24whereas theUS state
courts never adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory in such cases.25
4.2 Comparison: German Law
In Germany, only ad hoc disclosures are regulated by the German
Securities Exchange Act (Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel – WpHG)
whereas fraud through periodic disclosures is regulated by tort law, i.e.
the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB). Registration
statements are regulated by other statutes.26 To be sure, fraud in the
23 Judgment of 25 October 2007, 2006-Da-16758, 16765; Judgment of 11 October 2002,
2002-Da-38521.
24 Judgment of 12 September 1997, 96-Da-41991; Judgment of 28 January 2010, 2007-Da-
16007.
25 Cf. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993). See
Christopher Boffey, ‘Mirkin v. Wasserman: The Supreme Court of California Rejects
the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory in State Law Deceit Actions’, 49 Business Lawyer 715
(1994).
26 Registration statements are regulated by Verkaufsprospektgesetz and Börsengesetz. See
Barbara Grunewald and Michael Schlitt, Einführung in das Kapitalmarktrecht 235–261
(3.Aufl., C.H.Beck, 2014).
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primary market and fraud by ad hoc disclosure can also be actionable by
tort law and a sizable body of case law has been developed.27
Even though Germany has actively imported many principles and case
law in corporate law and securities regulation,28 the German law and
Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof: BGH) explicitly reject the
fraud-on-the-market theory.29 Fraudulent ad hoc disclosure is regulated
by Articles 37b (material omission) and 37c (misrepresentation) of the
WpHG. Article 37c requires the reliance element by stipulating that the
plaintiff shall have trusted the misrepresentation. In terms of Article 37b,
the transaction causation exists through the proposition that without the
material omission, the plaintiff would not have purchased the
securities.30 These Articles also require loss causation as an element of
the cause of action.31 The burden of proof on causation lies on the
plaintiff.32
German courts treat securities fraud litigations almost like general tort
law litigations.33 This is partly because frauds in the primary markets are
regulated only by the BGB. The German Federal Court once directly
referred to the ‘fraud-on-the-market theory in the US securities regula-
tion’ and rejected an adoption of the theory in fraudulent ad hoc dis-
closure cases in that such an adoption would expand the scope of
liabilities under Article 826 of the BGB too far.34
27 For the German law of securities fraud, see generally, Alexander Hellgardt,
Kapitalmarktdeliktsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Stefan Richter, Schadenszurechnung bei
deliktischer Haftung für fehlerhafte Sekundärmarktinformation (Mohr Siebeck, 2012). For
other European jurisdictions, see Klaus J Hopt and Hans Ch. Voigt (Hrsg.), Prospekt- und
Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung: Recht und Reform in der Europäischen Union, der
Schweiz und den USA (C.H.Beck, 2004).
28 See Jan von Hein, Die Rezeption US-amerikanischen Gesellschaftsrechts in Deutschland
(Mohr Siebeck, 2008).
29 See Kim, Theoretical Foundations of Securities Regulation, 88–92.
30 Peter O.Mülbert and Steffen Steup, ‘Haftung für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation’, in
Mathias Habersack et al. (Hrsg.), Unternehmensfinanzierung am Kapitalmarkt 915, 985
(2. Aufl., DrOttoSchmidt, 2008).
31 Mülbert and Steup, ‘Haftung für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation’, 986; Grunewald
and Schlitt, Einführung in das Kapitalmarktrecht, 288.
32 Mülbert and Steup, ‘Haftung für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation’, 987; Grunewald
and Schlitt, Einführung in das Kapitalmarktrecht, 288.
33 See BGH 28.11.2005 – II ZR 80/04, NZG 2007, 345, 346: BGH 4.6.2007, ZIP 2007, 1560,
1562.
34 BGH, Beschluss vom 26. Juni 2006 – II ZR 153/05; BGH, WM 2007, 1557, 1559
(ComROAD Case). Art. 826 of BGB applies to frauds in the secondary markets.
Richter, supra note 27, 82–83. To be actionable under Art. 826 of BGB, the transaction
causation between defendant’s misrepresentation and plaintiff’s investment
decision. Mülbert and Steup, ‘Haftung für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation’, 992.
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In addition to the conventional developments in tort law, German
academia and some court decisions have been referring to the concept of
‘Investment Atmosphere’ (Anlagestimmung). According to this line of
scholarly opinion and cases, the investors are presumed to have relied on
misrepresentation when the investor made an investment decision based
on an inflated investment atmosphere created by an investment prospec-
tus or memorandum.35 This is reminiscent of Basic. There have been
discussions in Germany on a possible expansion of the concept to
strengthen the liabilities out of misrepresentation in the capital markets.
The discussion was obviously influenced by the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis.36 However, the German Federal Supreme Court rejected the
concept. According to the Court, an investment decision depends upon
building of intent on an individual level to which many reasonable and
unreasonable factors contribute. Those factors cannot be easily
generalised.37 Many commentators support the Federal Supreme
Court’s rejection of the Anlagestimmung.38
4.3 A New Perspective
Now is the time to reconsider the whole thing. Circumstances have
significantly changed since 1997. Investor protection mechanisms are
relatively well in place in the Korean capital markets. Financial regulation
and supervision work reasonably well.39 Korea also needs a strong and
sound securities industry. The ultimate purpose of the KCMA has not
received the attention it needs. The primary purpose of the securities
regulation is the protection of investors. There is no debate about that.
But, the scope of the KCMA is much broader as its Article 1 stipulates.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Ibid., at 993. Plaintiff must prove that the
particular misrepresentation did constitute the core element of plaintiff’s investment
decision. Richter, Schadenszurechnung, at 88.
35 OLG Frankfurt a.M., WM 1994, 291, 198; OLG Frankfurt a.M., WM 1996, 1216, 1219.
36 See, e.g. Theodor Baums, ‘Haftung wegen Falschinformation des Sekundärmarkts’, 167
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 139 (2003); Knut Sauer,
‘Kausalität und Schaden bei der Haftung für falsche Kapitalmarktinformationen’,
Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft 24 (2005).
37 Richter, Schadenszurechnung, 89–92.
38 Matthias Casper, ‘The Significance of the Law of Tort with the Example of the Civil
Liability for Erroneous ad hoc Disclosure’, in Reiner Schulze ed., Compensation of Private
Losses, (De Gruyter, 2011) 91, 98; Richter, Schadenszurechnung, 91.
39 Cf. Hwa-Jin Kim, ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision in Corporate Governance of
Banks’, 41 Journal of Corporation Law 707 (2016).
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Article 1 (Purposes)
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of the national
economy by facilitating financial innovation and fair competition in the
capital market, protecting investors, fostering the development of the
financial investment business, and heightening the fairness, reliability,
and efficiency of the capital market.
The Korean Supreme Court’s adoption of the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory in its current fashionmust be changed. The KCMA should also, at the
very least, adopt Basic, i.e. the reliance requirement of the cause of action
must be added as German statute has already done. On a separate note,
there have been academic voices that express concern over the trend that
securities law is becoming a little too much like consumer protection
law.40 Balance is needed.
Korea has adopted many things from the United States law, including
the squeeze-out merger,41 the corporate opportunity doctrine42 and
securities class action. Others are waiting in line, such as the poison pill
and the dual-class commons. Unfortunately, some are misguided and ill
fated. The fraud-on-the-market theory in the KCMA in its current form
and tort law cases is the most conspicuous example.
40 Cf. Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation’, 55 Duke Law Journal 711 (2006), 713; Jeffrey N. Gordon and Lewis
A. Kornhauser, ‘Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research’, 60
New York University Law Review 761(1985), 802. See also the German literature
Grunewald and Schlitt, Einführung in das Kapitalmarktrecht, at 3; Petra Buck-Heeb,
Kapitalmarktrecht 3–7 (6.Aufl., C.F.Müller, 2013).
41 See Hyeok-Joon Rho, ‘New Squeeze-Out Devices as a Part of Corporate Law Reform in
Korea’, in Korean Business Law, Hwa-Jin Kim ed., (Edward Elgar, 2012), 52.
42 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung-Hwan Lee and Stephen Woodcock, ‘Favoritism and Corporate
Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Hyundai Motor Case’, 3
Michigan Journal of Private Equity and Venture Capital Law 41 (2013).
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